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Forthcoming Transnational Environmental Law

The Public Law Paradoxes of Climate Emergency Declarations
Jocelyn Stacey*
Abstract
Climate emergency declarations occupy a legally-ambiguous space between emergency measure
and political rhetoric. Their uncertain status in public law provides a unique opportunity to
illuminate latent assumptions about emergencies and how they are regulated in law. This article
analyzes climate emergency declarations in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand. It argues that these climate emergency declarations reflect back a set of paradoxes about
how emergencies are governed in law—paradoxes about defining the emergency, its relationship
to time and who gets to respond to the emergency and how. These paradoxes productively
complicate long-held and over-simplified assumptions about emergencies contained in public law.
They allow us to see the complex ways in which public law regulates emergencies—a necessity in
a climate-disrupted world.
Keywords: Climate emergency, emergency powers, disaster law, public law, Commonwealth

Introduction
‘We are in the midst of a climate emergency which poses a threat to our health, our planet and our
children and grandchildren’s future,’ London Mayor Sadiq Khan told the Guardian upon declaring
a climate emergency in the United Kingdom’s capital city. 1 Over 2,000 ‘climate emergency
declarations’ have been issued by governments around the world governing a total of over one
billion people.2 These declarations are a specific step taken by governments to acknowledge the
severity of global climate change and their own responsibility to act in response. They track the
increasingly urgent projections of scientists, global waves of youth climate strikes, and repeated
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1
Matthew Taylor, ‘London mayor unveils plan to tackle “Climate Emergency”’ (11 December 2018)
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/11/london-mayor-sadiq-khan-city-climate-emergency> last
accessed 07 July 2021.
2
International Climate Emergency Forum (ICEF), ‘Climate Emergency – Governments’ (13 Oct 2021)
<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tbLklFWLujYnjmCSvCWRcLUJCCWAL27dKPzVcFq9CQ/edit#gid=0> last accessed 13 Oct 2021.
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experiences of extreme events amplified by climate change—catastrophic flooding, engulfing
wildfires, deadly heatwaves around the world.
Framing climate change as an emergency is one of many ways of understanding this transnational,
existential, and all-encompassing phenomenon. Researchers have investigated the strategic
potential of various frames (such as economic and health) for advancing climate policy.3 Legal
scholars have focused on alternate frames that emerge through climate litigation. 4 Climate
emergency declarations present a new framing and a new site for legal analysis. Climate
emergency declarations seem to track the new reality of repeated, frequent extreme events, and
thus might be seen as laudable, or at least banal instruments in how they recognize sound scientific
evidence on climate impacts and require governments to take steps to fulfill commitments many
have already made through strategic plans, legislation or international agreement. But declarations
of emergency have always had an uncomfortable status in public law. Any attempt to invoke the
language of declarations of emergency should be scrutinized carefully, especially by legal
scholars, in light of the long history of emergencies undermining rule-of-law and human rights
commitments.
As we will see, climate emergency declarations present a public law puzzle. They are not
declarations of states of emergency—a conventional legal ‘tool’ employed by the state for
responding to an extreme event such as a wildfire—but nor are they mere rhetoric. They have
attracted scholarly attention, but not yet in law. In light of their ambiguous status, one temptation
for public law scholars might be to dismiss these declarations as irrelevant or incoherent. But it is
the transnational and legally-ambiguous nature of climate emergency declarations that creates a
unique opportunity to interrogate common assumptions about emergencies and how they are
regulated in law.
This article argues that climate emergency declarations can and should be used as a ‘spotlight,’
illuminating latent assumptions about emergencies held within public law scholarship. The
disruption of emergencies can ‘bring to the surface otherwise implicit aspects of normal politics’5
or highlight background systemic discrimination and oppression.6 We will see that, when reviewed
closely, these climate emergency declarations reflect back a set of paradoxes about how
emergencies are governed in law. These paradoxes productively complicate long-held and over3

H.M. Osofsky and J. Peel; ‘Energy Partisanship’ (2016) 65 Emory Law Journal 695; H.W. Cann, ‘Policy or
scientific messaging? Strategic framing in a case of subnational climate change conflict’ (2021) 38 Review of Policy
Research 570.
4
G. Nosek, ‘Climate Change Litigation and Narrative: How to Use Litigation to Tell Compelling Climate Stories’
(2018) 42 William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy Review 733; C. Hilson, ‘Framing Time in Climate Change
Litigation’ (2018) 9 Oñati Socio-legal Series 361.
5
D. Dyzenhaus, ‘Emergency, Liberalism and the State’ (2011) 9(1) Perspectives on Politics, pp. 69-78, at 69.
6
B. Anderson, ‘Emergency Futures: Exception, urgency, interval, hope’ (2017) 65(3) The Sociological Review, pp.
463-477 at 464-465; R. Luft, ‘Beyond Disaster Exceptionalism: Social Movement Developments in New Orleans
after Hurricane Katrina’ (2009) 61(3) American Quarterly, pp. 499-527.
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simplified assumptions about emergencies contained in public law and, in so doing, allow us to
see the complex ways in which public law regulates emergencies.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the phenomenon of climate emergency
declarations, the puzzle they present for public law scholars, and my methodology for analysing
these declarations. Part II addresses a set of perennial concerns and questions that emergencies
provoke in public law scholarship. We will see that three sets of questions emerge: how
emergencies are defined (the definitional challenge), how time regulates and contains emergency
power (the temporal challenge), and who responds to emergencies and how (the exceptionality
challenge). Part III is the heart of the paper, addressing in depth declarations of climate emergency.
Using the three sets of questions from Part II as guides, it analyses climate emergency declarations
and identifies definitional, temporal and exceptionality paradoxes contained in these declarations.
This article does not present a simple resolution to the legally-ambiguous nature of climate
emergency declarations. Rather, it insists on highlighting the nuance, variation and complexity
contained in these declarations. Climate change does not present a simple narrative, nor do climate
emergency declarations. Indeed, they can be understood as presenting a type of warning about the
necessity of a nuanced and multi-faceted understanding of emergencies as we contemplate the role
of law in governing a climate-disrupted world.

Part I. The Emergence of Climate Emergency Declarations
a. Introduction
The notion of climate emergency moved to the mainstream in 2019, 7 though scholars have
explored the notion of ‘climate emergency’ as a political or legal response to climate change for
some time.8 As a specific tool, climate emergency declarations occupy many of the intersections
that characterize transnational environmental law: the intersection between non-governmental and
governmental action, the intersections of multi-level goverance, and the intersection between law,
policy and politics. The transnational climate emergency declaration phenomenon began in 2016
in Australia with campaigns by non-governmental actors successfully targeting municipal
governments worldwide. Broad uptake by municipal governments in turn put pressure on national
and sub-national governments, regional and international actors as well as other institutions (e.g.
universities) to follow suit.9 The Guardian estimates that at least 38 countries have declared a
7

Oxford Languages, ‘Word of the Year 2019’ (Oxford University Press) <https://languages.oup.com/word-of-theyear/2019/ > last accessed 7 July 2021; Damian Carrington, ‘Why the Guardian is changing the language it uses
about the environment’ (17 May 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/17/why-theguardian-is-changing-the-language-it-uses-about-the-environment> last accessed 07 July 2021.
8

B. Lindsay, ‘Climate Exception: What Might a “Climate Emergency” Mean in Law?’ (2010) 38(2) Federal Law
Review, pp. 255-281.
9

For instance, the European Parliament declared a climate emergency on 29 Nov 2019; the United Nations
Secretary urged all countries to declare climate emergencies (12 Dec 2020), and universities around the world have
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climate emergency10 and a global database reports that nearly 2,000 municipalities have done the
same.11
Climate emergency declarations proliferated during 2019 alongside global student climate strikes
and on the heels of the 2018 Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) on Global Warming of 1.5°C, which detailed the anticipated catastrophic impacts of
exceeding a 1.5°C increase in average global temperature. Scientific projections grow increasingly
urgent each year. Relying on a suite of climate vital signs that extends beyond emissions (e.g.
growing livestock populations, tree cover loss), over 11,000 scientists concluded ‘clearly and
unequivocally that planet Earth is facing a climate emergency.’12
These dire projections, however, coincide with models outlining how rapid societal transition to
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions can curb the worst of the projected impacts. The same 2018
IPCC Special Report projected a deep reduction of emissions to 45% below 2010 levels by 2030,
reaching net zero by 2050, would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C.13 Further, the
report provided four model pathways for achieving these reductions.14 The IPCC’s reporting on
this narrow window of opportunity for concerted action to avoid catastrophe helped propel
activism around the climate emergency.
The promise of framing climate change as emergency is that this framing will provoke government
action to both mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and further reduce vulnerability to
climate impacts through adaptation. In a widely-cited report for local governments, Spratt writes:
The purpose of climate emergency declaration campaigning is to accelerate
sustained and meaningful action by all levels of government, and for people
globally to engage with the challenge of avoiding catastrophic climate change and
restoring a safe climate.

declared climate emergencies as well: e.g. Briony Latter and Stuart Capstick, ‘Climate Emergency: UK Universities’
Declarations and their Role in Responding to Climate Change’ (2021) Front. Sustain, online:
https://doi.org/10.3389/frsus.2021.660596.
10
Fiona Harvey, ‘UN secretary general urges all countries to declare climate emergencies’ (12 December 2020),
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/dec/12/un-secretary-general-all-countries-declare-climateemergencies-antonio-guterres-climate-ambition-summit> last accessed 11 Oct 2021.
11
Climate Emergency Declaration, ‘Climate emergency declarations in 2, 030 jurisdictions and local governments
cover 1 billion citizens <https://climateemergencydeclaration.org/climate-emergency-declarations-cover-15-millioncitizens/> last accessed 11 Oct 2021.
12
W. Ripple, et al, ‘”World Scientists” Warning of a Climate Emergency’ (2020) 70(1) Bioscience, pp. 8-12, at 8.
13
M. Allen et al, Summary for Policymakers, in V. Masson-Delmotte et al (eds) Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC
Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse
gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change,
sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (IPCC, 2018), pp. 3-24, at 12.
14
ibid, at 14-16.
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The goal is to provide maximum protection for the local community and for
people, civilisation and species globally, especially the most vulnerable, and to
enable local communities to be strong in the face of any unavoidable dangerous
climate impacts.15
Spratt, and others, identify a number of features of ‘emergency mode,’ which serve as a way of
breaking from a business-as-usual approach to governing. Climate emergency declarations, in their
view, have the virtues of taking seriously the worst-case scenario and presenting a clear purpose
for governmental action.16
At the same time, climate emergency declarations have been critiqued by some who take seriously
the climate challenge. For instance, Murphy argues that the call for climate emergency declarations
is ‘at best an ethically dubious move’ because of the grim historical record of states of emergency
and the reification of sovereign powers.17 Indeed, much of the literature that favourably considers
climate emergency discourse draws directly on wartime responses in support of climate emergency
action. 18 Hulme extends on this critique, observing that the reductive logic of the climate
emergency—intended to provoke urgent and coordinated action—does not help us address the
multitude of interlinked global challenges we face (e.g. climate change, biodiversity loss,
socioeconomic inequality) which demand ‘plural goals and political creativity’. 19 Indigenous
scholars similarly worry that climate emergency discourse crowds out alternate narratives and
justifies measures which retrench colonial power (e.g. the siting of ‘green’ energy projects).20
Scholars have analysed the use of emergency rhetoric as a tool for social change in other fields,
addressing similar concerns. While recognizing the long history of oppressive emergency actions,
Anderson notes that emergency discourse is often called upon by equity-seeking organizations to
make urgent ‘unbearable or barely bearable conditions into ethical or political scenes demanding
response.’21 In these cases, he argues that emergency declarations may be seen as hopeful because
15

D. Spratt, Understanding Climate Emergency and Local Government (Australia: Breakthrough - National Centre
for Climate Restoration, 2019).
16
D. Spratt & P Sutton, Climate Code Red: The Case for a Sustainability Emergency (Friends of the Earth, 2008);
K. Davidson, et al, ‘The Making of a Climate Emergency Response: Examining the Attributes of Climate
Emergency Plans’ (2020) 33 Urban Climate, pp. 100666; M. Chou ‘Australian Local Governments and Climate
Emergency Declarations: Reviewing Local Government Practice’ (2020) Australian Journal of Public
Administration.
17
M. Murphy, ‘Clement to the Corinthians (on climate change?): sojourning as a theologico-political alternative to
environmental emergency rhetoric’ (2020) 1 Cambridge Review of International Affairs, pp. 1-18.
18
S. Klein, A Good War: Mobilizing Canada for the Climate Emergency (ECW Press, 2020); Spratt, n. 15 above;
Leo Hickman, ‘James Lovelock: Humans are too stupid to prevent climate change’ (29 March 2010)
<https://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/mar/29/james-lovelock-climate-change> last accessed 19 July 2021.
19
M. Hulme, ‘Climate Emergency Politics Is Dangerous’ (2019) 36(1) Issues in Science and Technology, pp. 23-25,
at 25.
20
K. Whyte, ‘Against crises epistemology’ in B. Hokowhitu et al (eds), Routledge Handbook of Critical Indigenous
Studies (Routledge, 2020), pp. 52-64.
21
Anderson, n. 6 above, at 465.
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emergencies ‘are events or situations where action can still make a difference.’22 Similarly, Arbel
observes that treating as exceptional or anomalous the outcomes of unjust systems operating as
designed helps diffuse responsibility and perpetuate an unjust status quo.23 Turning to Arendt,
Arbel argues that instead a declared ‘emergency’ must provoke the needed reflection (and action)
on the structural causes of the declared emergency that have been laid bare.24
In contrast to these literatures, public law literature has thus far ignored climate emergency
declarations. Climate emergency declarations are not declarations of states of emergency. Unlike
the standard state of emergency declaration, these declarations are not orders made by the
executive under pre-existing emergency management legislation. Rather, they are statements made
predominantly by legislative bodies (Parliaments, legislatures and municipal councils), 25
sometimes accompanied by legislative reform and at other times not. Further, these declarations
do not authorize the use of measures typically associated with emergency response such as
evacuations or appropriations.26 While legal scholarship has begun to adopt emergency discourse
as an appropriate framing of the challenge of climate change,27 courts have yet to rule on climate
emergency declarations.28
The uncertain status of climate emergency declarations in public law presents somewhat of a
puzzle. They are neither conventional declarations of emergency nor mere rhetoric. They are
simultaneously seen as effective, dangerous and also ignorable. The remainder of this article
engages with the uncertain status of climate emergency declarations. It does so, not as an object of
law reform or external critique. Rather, it investigates the potential of these declarations to
illuminate existing assumptions about emergencies contained in public law.
b. Methodology
This paper undertakes a close reading of a subset of climate emergency declarations. It addresses
declarations issued in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand. The
selection of these jurisdictions is based predominantly on the shared common law tradition

22

Ibid, at 470.
E. Arbel, ‘Rethinking the “Crisis” of Indigenous Mass Imprisonment’ (2019) 34(3) Canadian Journal of Law and
Society, pp. 437-456.
24
Ibid, at 454-5. See also: Anderson, n. 6 above, at 474.
25
Although, in some jurisdictions, both the executive and the legislative branches of the stated have declared a
climate emergency (London and Wales), or just the executive (Scotland).
26
New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 53rd Leg, Vol 749 (December 2, 2020) at para 240; New Zealand,
Auckland Council, Environment and Standing Committee (11 June 2019), at section 9.
27
M. Fenner, ‘Constitutionalism during the Climate Emergency: Towards a Legal Realist Account of Transnational
Law’ (2020) 12(1) Amsterdam Law Forum, pp. 1-31.
28
But see J. Stacey, ‘Climate Disruption in Canadian Constitutional Law: References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution
Pricing Act’ (2021) forthcoming, Journal of Environmental Law on how the Supreme Court of Canada has seeded
the field for legal recognition climate change constituting an emergency.
23

6

Forthcoming Transnational Environmental Law
dominant in all countries. 29 This shared common law tradition is reflected in literatures on
emergency powers and the law, which frequently incorporate judicial decisions and other legal
developments from all four jurisdictions.30 I have not included the United States in this analysis to
avoid the ‘prism of the American experience’31 which refracts uniquely on both emergency powers
and climate change law and policy.
For each country, I have included and analysed all declarations issued at the national and
state/provincial/territorial scales. I have also included declarations for major cities within each
jurisdiction.32 Table 1 summarizes the key attributes of the declarations and their included in the
analysis. Climate emergency declarations began as a local phenomenon. As an example of
‘contagious environmental lawmaking’33 they have been taken up by higher levels of government
in addition to their world-wide transmission. In total, 16 jurisdictions have been included in this
study. While climate emergency declarations are a product of a transnational movement, and
patterns do emerge, the analysis that follows shows that these declarations are varied and textured
and contain complex dialogues about emergencies in public law.

Part II. Emergencies and Public Law
Emergencies feature prominently in legal theory, constitutional law and disaster law. While
different questions drive each of these literatures, they converge on a core set of worries: how
emergencies are defined (the definitional challenge), how time regulates and contains emergency
power (the temporal challenge), and who responds to emergencies and how (the exceptionality
challenge). For legal theorists these challenging issues of definitions, time and exceptional
measures emerge from the focus on the relationship between emergency (or the exception) and
legal order itself. Constitutional law scholars engage with these challenges through debates over
constitutional design. And for disaster law scholars, these challenges flow from their identification
of the predictable ways in which law and policy fails to prevent and ameliorate disaster
29

Although I note that Quebec and Scotland have hybrid legal traditions—with the common law tradition governing
public law and the civilian tradition governing private law—and Indigenous legal orders coexist alongside the
common and civil law in Canada, Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand.
30
E.g. K. Loevy, Emergencies in Public Law: The Legal Politics of Containment (Cambridge University Press,
2016); D. Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge University Press,
2006).
31
A. Dodek, ‘A Tale of Two Maps: The Limits of Universalism in Comparative Judicial Review’ (2009) 47(2)
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, pp. 287-316, at 294, quoted in R. Leckey, Bill of Rights in the Common Law
(Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 27.
32
Vancouver, Toronto, London, Melbourne, Sydney and Auckland.
33
N. Affolder, ‘Contagious Environmental Lawmaking’ (2019) 31(2) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 187-212. I
am mindful of Affolder’s caution about erasing local context and have sought to avoid a broad-brush analysis within
the scope of this study. I fully acknowledge the limits of a study that excludes Indigenous legal orders, civil law
traditions and the Global South. All of these jurisdictions have different legal histories and socio-political dynamics
associated with the exercise of emergency powers and each is deserving of detailed analysis of climate emergency
law and politics.
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vulnerability and their pathways for reform. Relying on the detailed work of Karin Loevy, this part
highlights how each of these bodies of scholarship rest on different sets of assumptions about
emergencies. Bringing these literatures together presents a complex picture of how emergencies
are governed by public law.
a. The Definitional Challenge
All three literatures engage with the definitional challenge of what constitutes an emergency. In
legal theory, the work of controversial Nazi legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, looms large. 34 For
Schmitt, the exception (the extreme emergency which threatens the state) is unpredictable and
cannot be anticipated nor completely defined in advance. 35 The declaration of the state of
exception and its response, he argues, are purely political determinations—made by and revealing
of sovereign power. As Loevy observes, this quality of ‘indefinability’ is presumed in much of the
legal theory and constitutional law scholarship. As a result, this literature is ‘either too focused on
an excessively limited set of conditions [the liminal case] or, more often, too invested in
institutional design that will confront all possible exigencies.’ 36 For instance, scholars debate
whether emergency powers should be understood as ‘inside or outside’ constitutional order.37
In contrast to the indefinable emergency, disaster literature offers numerous definitions of the
emergency, often focusing on the definitional contours between emergency, disaster, crisis, etc.38
In disaster law literature, the emergency is very much definable—and also observable and often
predictable. Hurricanes, fires, floods, and earthquakes all occur with regularity. Emerging
literature on climate disasters and the law confronts the issue of predictability. Scholars note, on
the one hand, that climate change is amplifying the threat of extreme events such that ‘[d]isasters
are becoming the new normal.’39 But at the same time, they observe that we can no longer ‘rely

34

O. Gross & F. Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge University
Press, 2006), pp. 171-244; Loevy, n. 30 above; D. Dyzenhaus, ‘Schmitt v. Dicey: are states of emergency inside or
outside the legal order?’ (2006) 27(5) Cardoza Law Review, pp. 2005-2039.
35
C. Schmitt, Political Theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty (George Schwab tr, MIT Press, 1985),
at 6-7.
36
Loevy, n. 30 above, pp. 59-60.
37
Dyzenhaus, n. 34 above.
38
E. L., Quarantelli, What is a Disaster? A dozen perspectives on the Question (Routledge, 1998); S.C. Breau &
K.L.H Samuel, ‘Chapter 1: Introduction’, in S.C. Breau & K.L.H Samuel (eds) Research Handbook on Disasters
and International Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), pp. 1-20, p. 4; J. Hopkins, ‘The first victim: administrative
law and natural disasters’ (2016) 1, New Zealand Law Review, pp. 189-211; A. Herwig, ‘Resilience and
Responsibility in international law: The achievements of the Sendia framework through the example of climate
change’, in A. Herwig & M. Simoncini (eds), Law and the Management of Disasters (Routledge, 2016), pp. 139159.
39
D.A. Farber & L Grow Sun, ‘Foreword’ in S.S. Kuo et al (eds) Cambridge Handbook on Disaster Law and Policy
(Forthcoming), pp. 1-23, p. 5.
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on historical data to assess future risks’ and that we must prepare for clustering and cascading
disasters, for which we have little precedent.40
Bringing together some of these background assumptions, Loevy shows how the definitional
challenge materializes in law. Her close examination of the prominent post-9/11 decision of the
UK House of Lords in Belmarsh 41 shows how, on the one hand, the Court insists that the
declaration of an emergency was indefinable—a political decision that the Court could not review.
Yet, at the same time, the record before the Court and, indeed the Court’s own reasons, were
crowded with potential definitions for the alleged emergency. These potential definitions drew on
standardized sources (legal precedent, the parties’ evidence) and precise attention to who or what
was threatened and how. The definitional challenge—and conflicting responses to this challenge—
are embedded in law. And, as Loevy’s interpretation Belmarsh shows, these conflicts can reside
in a single decision to significant legal effect.
b. The Temporal Challenge
Legal theory, constitutional law and disaster law each address the role of time in regulating the
emergency. Legal theory and constitutional law scholarship emphasize the role of time in defining
and containing the emergency. In these literatures, time plays a ‘double role’ of urgency and
temporariness.42 Loevy describes this as the assumption of ‘exceptional time: because emergencies
require immediate response, emergency powers enable exceptional measures to be exercised for
an exceptional, limited period of time.’43 The worry, then, in both legal theory and constitutional
law is the normalization of exceptional, emergency powers as permanent features of constitutional
order. Indeed, many argue that this is already the case.44 Agamben argues that the emergency threat
is not the suspension of legal order in its entirety, as Schmitt’s theory suggests, but rather the
pockets of exceptional power embedded throughout the legal system.45 This produces ‘zones of
indifference’, not inside or outside legal order but suspended in between, which deprive individuals
of the full protection of the law.46 For Agamben and others, the emergency reveals the failure of
liberal legal order both in theory and in practice.47
40
ibid, pp. 6-7; L. Grow Sun & S. McCormick, ‘Foreseeable Disaster Mismanagement in a Changing Climate’ in A.
Sarat (ed) Special Issue Cassandra’s Curse: The Law and Foreseeable Future Disasters (Emerald Publishing
Limited, 2015), p. 81.
41
A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 [2005] 2AC 68.
42
Loevy, n. 30 above, p. 218.
43
Ibid.
44
Gross & Aolain, n. 34 above; S. Levinson, ‘Constitutional Norms in a state of permanent emergency’ (2006)
40(3) Georgia Law Review, pp. 699-751; K. Scheppele, ‘Small Emergencies’ (2006) 40(3) Georgia Law Review, pp.
835-862.
45
Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Kevin Attell tr, University of Chicago Press, 2005), at 6-7.
46
ibid, at 23.
47
These failings are powerfully documented in research on emergency powers and colonialism. See, eg, J.
Reynolds, Empire, Emergency and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017); N. Hussain, The
Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law (University of Michigan Press, 2019).

9

Forthcoming Transnational Environmental Law

The observation that emergency powers are permanent—not temporary—jibes with disaster law
scholarship. This literature emphasizes ongoing regulation through a cycle of disaster
management, not simply the declaration of emergency.48 In this way, emergency measures are very
much normalized: public institutions should always be in some stage of regulating the emergency,
be it prevention, preparedness, response or recovery. Moreover, principles such as ‘disaster risk
reduction’ make clear that it is not just specialized government departments that should be engaged
in this cycle, but rather all institutional decision-making must implement disaster risk reduction.49
On this view, managing emergencies ought to be built into the very machinery of government.
Loevy’s work demonstrates how these layers of time play out in the real-world regulation of
emergencies.50 By examining the archetypal question of the legality of torture in the face of the
‘ticking time bomb,’ Loevy convincingly refutes the conventional assumption that this is a
situation governed by ‘exceptional time.’ Through a close analysis of the famous 1999 torture
decision of the Israel Supreme Court,51 Loevy unpacks the multiple timescales in the decision.
This includes, for instance, the notion of ongoing and circular time relied on by intelligence
officials (and emergency management staff generally)52 to anticipate, prepare, respond and recover
from threats. She observes that multiple legal timescales factor into the decision: for instance, the
expedited court proceedings, and the possibility of ex post criminal liability.53 Pushing beyond the
assumptions of urgency or the temporary/permanent binary, her careful attention to context reveals
multiple timescales, some exceptional, but others structural and ongoing—all of which govern the
emergency.

c. The Exceptionality Challenge
Finally these literatures all address questions of whether and how to authorize exceptional
emergency response measures and how to hold accountable the exercise of such powers. While
many scholars doubt the resort to exceptional powers in specific cases,54 few doubt that in some
48

J. Stacey, ‘Vulnerability, Canadian Disaster Law and The Beast’ (2018) 55(4) Alberta Law Review, pp. 853-887;
R. Verchick, ‘Disaster Justice: the geography of human capability’ (2012) 23(1) Duke Environmental Law & Policy
Forum, pp. 23-71.
49
N. Britton, ‘A New Emergency Management for the New Millennium?’ (2001) 16(4) Australian Journal of
Emergency Management, pp. 44-54; M. Picard, ‘Disaster Management, risk reduction and international disaster
response laws in the Commonwealth’ (2017) 43(3-4) Commonwealth Law Bulletin, pp. 403-437; Sendai Framework
for Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai (Japan), 19 Mar. 2015. Available at:
https://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf
50
See also U.F. Paleo, ‘Timescape of disaster risk governance in contemporary Japan: Neither state of normalcy nor
constancy in regulation’ (2019) 14(4) PloS one, pp. 1-16. On multiple timescapes in Japanese disaster law.
51
HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v Israel [1999] IsrSC 46(2).
52
Stacey, n. 48, above.
53
Loevy, n. 30 above, pp. 245-255.
54
The literature on 9/11 is voluminous.
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instances exceptional measures will be necessary to respond to an extreme threat.55 Exceptional
emergency powers raise a set of worries shared across literatures: consolidating power in the
executive branch, unfettered discretion, undermining individual rights and freedoms (especially of
vulnerable populations), and eroding administrative law protections of transparency, participation
and access to the courts.56 Legal theory, constitutional law and disaster each address whether and
how these powers can be authorized and held to account, though in slightly different ways.
In legal and constitutional theory, emergencies are often tied to notions of ‘sovereign control.’57
For Schmitt and legal theorists who follow his thinking, both the state of exception and its response
are declared by the sovereign (the modern-day executive), and conversely, the exception reveals
who in fact the sovereign is.58 In this view, the executive is activated, empowered and wields
power that is unconstrained by law. Legal theorists and constitutional scholars thus focus on
questions of constitutional design which acknowledge the need for emergency response but still
contain the exercise of these exceptional powers. For instance, some argue in favour of derogation
models, as represented by Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is said
to create a ‘double-layered constitutional system: both layers exist within a regime of legality but
only one exists within the human rights regime.’59 Others note the prevalence of a legislative
model in which emergency management legislation delegates specific emergency response powers
to the executive branch.60 Both constitutional and legislative models acknowledge the necessity of
exceptional measures, but seek to subject these measures to some legal constraints to ensure the
preservation of legal order.
Disaster law, too, urges law reform that anticipates the emergency and the appropriate response.
Contemporary paradigms for disaster management—namely risk, vulnerability and resilience—
all ‘decentre’ emergency response. Instead, they emphasize preparedness and continuous learning,
which take place through ordinary and familiar practices of legislation, regulation and planning.61
55
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exceptional powers, arguing that public officials are always subject to requirements of justification and to abandon
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impinging freedom of movement is subject to the same rule-of-law requirement of public justification as an nonemergency measure: Dyzenhaus, n. 30 above.
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Disaster law researchers identify the predictable ways in which emergency response fails and,
accordingly, they identify the best practices that address these forms of mismanagement. 62
Emergency management legislation, which identifies roles and responsibilities, is a must. 63
Dedicated emergency management legislation which explicitly links to other legal regimes to
reduce vulnerability to disaster is even better.64 Scholars argue that legislation must require or
facilitate adaptive and resilient practice, such as through robust emergency planning.65 And they
highlight the role of legislation in addressing predictable failures by countering disaster myths,
setting out guiding principles and making tough choices in advance.66 In this literature, it is very
much the law of the ‘ordinary’ that is—or should be—the dominant mode of governing the
emergency.
In contrast to legal and constitutional theory, disaster law literature does not presume a unified and
activated executive responding to a threat. Growing out of major disasters, such as Hurricane
Katrina, disaster law scholarship identifies the ‘jurisdictional problems’67 that often characterize
emergencies. Indeed, recent emergencies such as wildfires and the COVID-19 pandemic have
highlighted numerous high-stakes jurisdictional problems around the world in federations and
settler states. 68 In these moments of emergency response, such as the pandemic, different
jurisdictions (national, sub-national, Indigenous) jostle for control—or redirect blame elsewhere—
as they engage other jurisdictions to mount a response. Moreover, the influence of ‘resilience
thinking’ on disaster scholarship means that all sectors of society—e.g. community members,
business, international organizations—should be enlisted in disaster management. Catch phrases
of ‘whole community’ and ‘all purpose means’ capture the capacious concept of disaster resilience,
which aims to have as much of the affected population as possible be in a position to help
themselves and each other and freeing up government support for the most vulnerable.69 In contrast
to the image of centralized emergency powers portrayed in legal theory and constitutional
literature, disaster law literature emphasizes decentralization through the mobilization of all of
society in disaster risk reduction.
Holding accountable the exercise of emergency powers is a major theme in all of these literatures.
Much legal theory and constitutional scholarship focuses on the relatively weak role that courts
emphasizes the structural drivers of disaster risk and vulnerability (such as poverty, racism, ableism) all of which
must be addressed through reform that happens outside of the acute emergency response.
62
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have historically played in constraining the exercise of emergency powers. This leads some to
argue for an understanding of the emergency response which is ‘extra-legal’ and subject only to
political—and not judicial—oversight. 70 Others argue for more robust judicial review of
emergency powers,71 or for creative institutional design.72 Picking up on the possibility of creative
institutional design, and on the complicated jurisdictional problems documented in disaster law
literature, Loevy argues that accountability can only be understood by a close analysis of realworld institutional dynamics. She argues that institutional competence and culture always contain
constraints, even if conventional and formal legal controls appear weak. 73 She observes, as
examples, the influence of public institutions such as the UK Joint Commission on Human Rights
and the US Office of Legal Counsel in the exercise of counter-terrorism measures. She finds that
specific institutional cultures and competencies of those actors involved in emergency response
explain how power is constrained.
Legal theory, constitutional law and disaster law scholarship contain many and varied assumptions
about emergencies—how they are defined, regulated by time, authorized and held to account.
Sometimes these assumptions operate in parallel, but often these literatures present intersecting
and divergent characterizations of emergencies and their governance in law. We have also seen
that discordant assumptions appear in specific legal decisions, sometimes with significant legal
effect. We will now see that climate emergency declarations reflect back this complexity through
manifold definitions, diverse temporal narratives, and tensions between authorization and
accountability.

Part III. The Paradoxes of Climate Emergency Declarations
This part turns to the climate emergency declarations themselves. 74 While not conventional
declarations of emergency, we will see that these declarations engage with the same three sets of
perennial concerns about emergencies in public law. Furthermore, we will see that the ways in
which these challenges of definition, time and exceptionality are addressed in climate emergency
declarations reveal multiple paradoxes in emergencies and emergency powers.
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a. Definitional Paradoxes
City Council declare[s] a climate emergency for the purpose of naming, framing, and deepening
our commitment to protecting our economy, our ecosystems and our community from climate
change. — Toronto City Council
What precisely is the climate emergency? Two definitional paradoxes emerge from the texts of
these declarations and their justifications. First, the declarations call upon the known and the
unknowable elements of emergencies. Second, the declarations narrow the problem of climate
change to an acute crisis while simultaneously addressing the systemic nature of the problem.
Many climate emergency declarations tap into the sense that emergencies are fundamentally
unknowable. In Quebec, the threat is ‘“abrupt and irreversible climate change” threatening life
and civilization as we know it.’ In the UK, ‘we are talking about nothing less than the irreversible
destruction of the environment.’75 South Australia, too, describes the emergency as the destruction
of vital ecosystems. The Senedd/Wales Legislative Assembly declaration anticipates that the
climate emergency ‘will wreak havoc upon the livelihoods of countless people across the world.’
In these ways, the emergency is presented as looming, dramatic, and ill-defined.
At the same time, these declarations tie the definition of the ‘climate emergency’ to known threats,
conventional emergencies, and in many cases recent experiences of record-breaking extreme
events. The City of Sydney states: ‘it is not just their frequency which is alarming – [heat waves]
start earlier, become hotter, and last longer.’ In Vancouver, the experiences of the 2017 and 2018
wildfires in British Columbia and neighbouring California provide evidence of the climate
emergency.76 These declarations then extrapolate out from these known events. In Yukon, South
Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand, declaration sponsors identify the underlying purpose of
emergency measures—to protect lives and communities from acute threats—and extrapolate to
climate change. Climate change, one sponsor observes, poses the same kind of threat but on a
‘much grander scale.’77
Most jurisdictions rely on scientific projections of climate impacts, and in particular the 2018 IPCC
Special Report, to justify their emergency declarations and render the emergency ‘knowable.’ 78
The scientific consensus on climate change and its impacts is a vital and necessary part of these
debates. Indeed, the 2018 IPCC Special Report performs significant justificatory work. In the UK,
75
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for instance, the motion’s sponsor stated ‘[t]he science tells us this is an emergency…’ 79 In
Canada, this same sentiment was echoed by the declaration’s sponsor: ‘The reason we need to
recognize [the] increasing climate emergency is because that is what the science tells us.’80 In these
rationales, we can see attempts to render emergency declarations knowable—but also apolitical—
by invoking the ‘exonerating discourses’ of scientific and rational assessment of the problem.81
We see in these declarations what Wainwright and Mann call
two rhythms… not synchronized…There is, on one hand, the almost
imperceptible background noise of rising seas and upward ticking of food prices,
punctuated, on the other hand, by the occasional pounding of stochastic events.82
The climate emergency is a threat known and experienced, felt acutely in those stochastic events
of deadly wildfires, floods and heat waves. But in many ways, the coming real emergency is still
unknown. The reminder that the worst is still to come is rendered ‘almost imperceptible’ as
background noise. The chaotic agent of the emergency is ever-present, the looming backdrop to
contemporary life.
These declarations also work to both narrow and widen the definition of the threat of climate
change by delineating its acute and systemic dimensions. A narrow and specific definition of
emergency is necessary to mobilize an emergency response—to prioritize and coordinate action
around a central purpose. Climate emergency declarations narrow the framing of the global and
all-encompassing phenomenon of climate change by focusing on the local. The Vancouver
declaration, for instance, depicts the emergency as the estimated $7 billion in property damage that
would result from a major flood in the urban centre.
Declarations also narrow the framing of climate change to the core challenge of GHG emissions
reductions.83 As one legislator said, ‘The new currency of the ACT [Australian Capital Territory]
needs to be emissions and climate change. That is what we must value.’84 As we will see below,
these declarations commit specifically to emissions reductions targets and measures.
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At the same time, the global and systemic nature of the climate challenge is not completely lost in
the climate emergency debates and resulting measures. Many jurisdictions reference climate
impacts felt elsewhere in the world and the responsibility to act to ameliorate those impacts.85 The
Aotearoa/New Zealand declaration (one of the latest declarations in this set) references ‘the over
1,800 jurisdictions in 32 countries’ who have already declared a climate emergency as support for
its declaration. The Quebec National Assembly supports its declaration almost entirely on the basis
that other jurisdictions have acted, citing the UN Security Council and the fact that emergency
declarations have been issued by ‘395 municipalities, ten universities and nearly a hundred civil
society organizations’ in the province. The Welsh declaration expresses support for local
governments across Wales in declaring a climate emergency. Each of Vancouver, London and
Sydney’s declarations expresses solidarity with local governments worldwide, which have also
declared a climate emergency.
A number of jurisdictions widen the emergency frame to capture systemic and interrelated
challenges by coupling the threat of climate change with species extinction. In Aotearoa/New
Zealand, the climate emergency declaration also ‘recognise[s] the alarming trend in species decline
and global biodiversity crisis.’ Melbourne declared that both climate change and ‘mass species
extinction… should be treated as an emergency.’ The unique ecologies of these two countries
might explain the explicit reference to species extinction. But the UK Parliament and Northern
Ireland Legislative Assembly also recognize species decline as part of the climate emergency. This
repeated linking of climate change and mass extinction is an important reminder that climate
change ‘is part of a family of interlocking problems… all planetary in scope and all speaking to
the fact of an overall ecological overshoot on the part of humanity.’86 Moreover, the finality of
species loss is a tangible reminder of the existential nature of the climate threat.87
Many jurisdictions identify the particular communities made more vulnerable by climate change
and, in so doing, hint at systemic issues such as colonialism, racism and economic inequality
entangled with climate change. For example, Canada’s declaration notes the heightened impacts
on coastal, northern and Indigenous communities. Sydney connects the climate crisis to ongoing
colonization, through the continued approval of coal mines which undermine the ‘sovereignty and
self-determination of First Australians.’ Economic inequality features across the declarations,
noting the vulnerability of those in poverty to both climate impacts and climate transition. Sydney
identifies ‘the poorest amongst us – the vulnerable, the marginalised and those that live in remote
communities’ as susceptible to climate change. Government inaction on climate mitigation,
Sydney’s declaration notes, has had significant social impacts: ‘Thousands face unemployment,
denied potential jobs in a burgeoning renewable energy sector…’ Yukon, too, notes the social
vulnerability of being a northern territory and the associated challenges of transitioning from fossil
85
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fuels.88 Finally, in many jurisdictions climate emergency declarations have since become linked
with recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, with some jurisdictions translating lessons learned
in the pandemic to climate change.89
This tension between the acute and systemic is eloquently captured in the debates leading to the
unanimous declaration in Yukon, a northern Canadian territory:
We are seeing wildlife and plant species claim habitat in places they haven’t been before.
Water systems are changing course or drying up. They are low or taking new paths as
glacial sources retreat. Species like the pine beetle are threatening to make their way to
Yukon’s forests. Wildfires are becoming more frequent and intense. Buildings and
highways are needing more and more expensive repairs due to the permafrost thawing
under them. These changes and more are affecting the way that we do business, our
economy, the way we interact with the land, and our cultures. There’s no doubt we are in
the midst of a climate crisis.90
The environment, the community, the economy, and a way of life are all threatened by the climate
emergency. But these are not generic statements or ‘imperceptible background noise.’ In the north,
the climate emergency is tangible and felt: ‘you [can] smell the soil in the air because of the
permafrost melting.’91
Climate emergency declarations provide layers of definitions for the emergency. I have identified
two paradoxes embedded in these layered definitions. First, the climate emergency is known and
felt through the lived experiences of many communities which now lived ‘under’ a declared
climate emergency. Common sets of experiences, concerns and sources—such as the IPCC Special
Report—provide the basis for defining and declaring a climate emergency. At the same time, these
declarations also call upon the unknowable looming future which is ‘worse, much worse, than you
think’92 to justify declaring a climate emergency. This framing of the extreme threat is used to
engage ‘emergency mode’ to focus government attention and action on the immediate emergency
of rapidly reducing GHG emissions. But this narrow framing, too, is embedded within a web of
systemic crises highlighted through these declarations, such as mass extinction and systemic
inequality.
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b. Temporal Paradoxes
The IPCC has given us 12 years. In climate science, that is a heartbeat. We have to get this right.
– Richard Benyon (Member for Newbury), UK Parliament93
As we saw in Part II, debates about the legal regulation of emergency are bound up in notions of
time. While the notion of ‘exceptional time’— that there is no time in an emergency—is a common
assumption in public law literature, emergencies are in fact regulated along multiple timescales.
Climate emergency declarations eschew simple temporal narratives. We will see that two further
paradoxes emerge from a close read of the timescales portrayed in these declarations. First, climate
emergency declarations both compress and expand our perception of time. Second, the
declarations treat the climate emergency as both temporary and permanent.
As the epigraph shows, Loevy’s notion of exceptional time plays a prominent role in the framing
of these climate emergency declarations, compressing our sense of time and generating urgency.94
The emergency takes place in ‘a heartbeat.’ Most of the declarations, as we have seen above,
emphasize the urgent need for action. This is because communities are already experiencing the
disruption of a changing climate.95 In the words of the UK Parliament, ‘[t]his is no longer about a
distant future.’96 In Quebec, it is ‘too late for gradual transition’ and the time to take dramatic
action is now.97 The UK motion extolled that ‘We have no time to waste’ and, in Wales, that ‘time
is ticking away against us.’98 Urgency is stressed in multiple declarations, both to reduce emissions
and also to ‘capture economic opportunities and green jobs.’ 99 In contrast, the Canadian
declaration is critiqued by the opposition for the one month delay in placing it on the agenda,
undermining the claim that there is no time.100 And in Wales, legislative members criticized the
mere thirty minutes allowed for parliamentary debate on the motion.101
But these declarations also expand the temporal horizon beyond the present to incorporate both
the past and future. As we have seen, the climate emergency in some cases is a response to the
immediate past: recent record-breaking heat waves, floods and fires. But they stretch even further
93
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back along geologic time. In Yukon, the legislative debate repeatedly noted the remarkable
increase in average temperature in the north: a 2.3°C increase between 1948 and 2016 (with a
corresponding 4.3°C increase in winter temperatures). 102 One member captured the sense of
geologic time by calling the climate emergency a ‘slow-moving… ever-evolving emergency.’103
Others called the declaration ‘bittersweet’ because while government action is finally happening,
there is still so much to do.104 In Aotearoa/New Zealand, one member spoke of the ‘time we cannot
get back’ in reference to now precarious species survival.105 The sense that the climate emergency
has now arrived thus hangs together with the much longer timescale along which human activity
has brought this emergency into being.
Climate emergency declarations also contain the decidedly ‘unexceptional’ timescale of
emergency management: plodding, ongoing, managerial. As discussed further below, this
manifests through the combination of targets, plans and reporting obligations, all consistent with
conventional, regularized and continual government tools for emergency management. Time
marches steadily on through ongoing planning, interim targets, reporting requirements and end
goals.
In contrast to the quotidian, ongoing practice of emergency regulation, grander temporal narratives
emerge as well. Climate emergency declarations tell constitutional stories about the past and future
identity (or identities) of the community and the roles of their public institutions. 106 This
constitutional narrative is perhaps the strongest in the UK debates in which multiple members
noted the country’s responsibility to act on climate change:
This is the mother of all Parliaments. This is the country that had the first industrial
revolution. It is our moral responsibility to come together as a Parliament and show the
leadership that people across the world rightly expect of us.107
The distant past—the industrial revolution—offers a source of inspiration for the coming ‘green
industrial revolution.’108 The debates also draw on the nation’s responses to the World Wars to
galvanize support for efforts to address the climate emergency. While the constitutional narrative
in the UK is one of national unity, legislative debates in Canada, Scotland, Northern Ireland and
Aotearoa/New Zealand failed to generate this sense of ‘rally round the flag’ unity.
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The constitutional narrative is also projected into the future by imagining how this moment of
either action or inaction will be looked back upon. In the UK, one parliamentarian notes: ‘We have
a chance to act before it is too late… It is our historic duty to take it.’ 109 Across national
governments, this timescale is represented through an acknowledged obligation to young people
and future generations. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, this obligation flows from Māori law as well:
We have an obligation to our rangatahi [young people] to unite and to do everything as
kaitaki [leaders] to protect our taiao [world] and our whānau [future generations] from the
climate crisis in the short time we have left.110
This connection between the urgent now and the far-off future flips on its head the conventional
worries about the permanent emergency in legal scholarship. The moral (or perhaps even
constitutional) obligation to act now, as discussed here, is what is needed to ensure that a state of
climate emergency does not become permanent.
These varied and criss-crossing timelines complicate the assumption that emergencies are
temporary events. We see that, in some ways, the contemplated response is very much ordinary
law and governance with no clear end point for measures such as new building code regulations
or carbon pricing schemes. At the same time however, the year 2050 operates as a precipice in
these declarations. 111 It is an open question of what the future beyond 2050 looks like. Is it
permanent climate emergency, as the Quebec Citizens’ Universal Declaration describes:
‘economic collapse, public health crises, worldwide food shortage, annihilation of biodiversity,
and national and international security crises of unprecedented scope’?112 Or is it restoration of
some pre-2005 or pre-1990 status quo ante?113
These declarations of climate emergency and their implementation thus reveal another temporal
paradox, a tension between preservation and transformation. If the climate emergency is
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temporary, then the objective of the declaration is to preserve some notion of pre-emergency
normality. But perhaps the climate emergency has permanent transformative potential to bring
about some different vision of the future. Much in these declarations focuses on preventing the
worst of anticipated climate impacts in order to stabilizing some notion of the status quo. For
instance, most implementation documents prominently feature support for electrification of
transportation, e.g. investments and incentives for electric vehicles. 114 Some jurisdictions are
explicit about intentions to rely on carbon capture technology or offset measures, which may not
yet (nor ever be) feasible. 115 Many are enthusiastic about new opportunities for developing
biofuels, hydrogen technology, and generally the renewable energy economy.116 The UK Citizens’
Assembly report also echoes this desire to preserve the status quo through, for instance, its
recommendations to minimize restrictions on travel and lifestyles and to balance the freedom to
fly with net zero targets. 117 On this view, the climate emergency is something temporary,
exceptional—and avoidable—by taking steps to adjust current practices but without disrupting the
status quo.
At the same time, however, many of these declarations contemplate something more
transformative. Vancouver’s climate declaration is framed around justice and equality, with these
commitments deepening through implementation in the form of a Climate Justice Charter and
partnership with Indigenous Peoples.118 While the Scottish government has expressed its keen
interest in status-quo-reinforcing carbon capture technology, the Scottish Just Transition
Commission and Citizens’ Assembly have called on the government to undertake transformative
change by, for instance, centering government decision-making frameworks on the concept of
well-being rather than GDP.119
The Tāmaki Makaurau/Auckland response to the climate emergency also outlines a transformative
vision which, incorporating Māori law, calls for
a change in our response to climate change, re-framing, re-imagining and re-setting the
current system, and a shift from a human-centred approach to an ecological-centred
approach given our symbiotic relationships with the natural environment.120
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With Māori knowledge integrated throughout, the plan outlines a broad set of goals—not simply
rapid emissions reduction—but also ‘social, environmental, economic and cultural wellbeing.’121
The plan incorporates Māori-led ‘transformational priority pathways’ including regeneration of
ecological systems and shifting to a regenerative economy,122 and these are further backed by
specific actions.123 While many specific items of the plan’s 26 sub-actions track those in other
jurisdictions, the Tāmaki Makaurau/Auckland framing of the climate emergency also embraces
permanent, transformational change.
From the perspective of the official opposition in the New Zealand House of Representatives, the
anticipated climate transformation does not bend in the direction of justice. Speaking against the
motion, one member described the climate emergency as license to
tell you what car you can drive, what days you can drive, the size of your house, how much
energy you can use and where you buy it from, and how many flights you can take. …
Success means not having the climate change Minister telling us how to live our lives to
cut emissions—because that means failure in every sense.124
On this view, the climate emergency is being used as cover to avoid scrutiny of a transformative
government agenda, engaging the enduring skepticism of legal scholars that emergency powers
can ever be temporary. We can see how conflicting characterizations of time are embedded in
these declarations. In some ways, they seem to invoke conventional emergency framing which
demands temporary departure from the rule of law to preserve the status quo ante. In other ways,
they reflect an expression of the urgent need to depart from the status quo to better realize rule-oflaw aspirations in a changing environment. If the latter is the case, then perhaps the ‘emergency’
frame is too limited to describe the full potential of these declarations.125
A close read of these declarations shows that multi-layered temporal horizons characterize the
climate emergency. The effect of these declarations is both to compress and extend our perception
of time and challenge assumptions about the temporary nature of emergency measures. By
declaring an emergency, these statements present a picture of ‘an on-rushing future that severs the
present from the past and compresses the time for decision and action.’126 As stated in the Yukon
Legislature and Senedd, the declaration must be treated as a new beginning.127 At the same time,
however, these declarations call on both distant pasts and futures as sources of obligation,
inspiration and action. And they grapple with competing objectives of preserving the status quo—
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by treating the climate emergency as temporary and exceptional—versus the transformative
possibilities of emergency governance. Just as climate change plays out on multiple time scales,
so too do these declarations.
c. Exceptionality Paradoxes
The motion before us employs all the implied drama of the word “emergency”, but it does so
with zero practical effect. – Nicola Willis, New Zealand House of Representatives128
This section considers who responds to the climate emergency and how. As we saw above,
questions about emergency response focus on anxieties about authority (who gets to decide and
what exceptional powers they have) and accountability (how to prevent and correct executive
overreach). Climate emergency declarations contain paradoxes of authority and accountability.
We will see that implementation of these declarations is characterized by both the ordinary and
exceptional; familiar practices and new instruments. Moreover, implementation is characterized
by both unilateral action and jurisdictional challenges; consolidation and creative institutional
design.
Responses to the climate emergency contemplate both familiar measures and also institutional
creativity. One view of climate emergency declarations, captured in the epigraph, is that they do
nothing—they do not authorize anything new and certainly not the kind of exceptional powers
typically associated with emergencies.129 Indeed, the bulk of these climate emergency declarations
operate through ordinary government functions of planning, setting targets, and reporting. Thus
far, implementation of these plans has not led jurisdictions to invoke exceptional measures.130
Rather, they have relied on investment, non-binding policies, education, advocacy and the ordinary
legislative process (e.g. bills to legislate GHG reduction targets and new city by-laws).131
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This reliance on decidedly ordinary governmental powers lends some support to the view
expressed in the epigraph, that climate emergency declarations have no emergency ‘substance.’
So too does the fact that a number of jurisdictions have undertaken subsequent climate measures
that make no reference to their declaration of climate emergency.132 In most cases, jurisdictions
have not issued separate plans or measures to respond to the climate emergency declaration.133
Rather, many incorporate references to the climate emergency declaration into plans and actions
already underway. From a strictly causal perspective, it is thus difficult to discern what, if any,
difference the declaration of climate emergency has made to a ‘business as usual,’ which, in some
jurisdictions, already contemplated considerable emissions reductions.134
Recall, though, that disaster law literature emphasizes the predictable and ongoing regulation of
emergency management. From this perspective, climate emergency declarations are operating as
they should. With contemporary disaster research emphasizing resilience, the regulatory emphasis
shifts from response to preparedness and risk reduction. A key feature of emergency preparedness
is an emergency a plan which identifies vulnerabilities, priorities, roles and responsibilities.
Relatedly, as we have seen, disaster risk reduction requires all institutions of government to operate
in concert to mitigate disaster risk outside of acute emergency response. The Scottish Climate
Change Secretary, in her declaration of climate emergency, captures these insights stating that
“[a]n emergency needs a systematic response that is appropriate to the scale of the challenge and
not just a knee-jerk, piecemeal reaction.”135 Many of the climate implementation plans issued by
these jurisdictions do just this—provide a systematic response which engages cross-government
departments and multiple sectors of society. A number of these plans specifically require a ‘whole
of government response,’ including the application a ‘climate lens’ to all government decisionmaking.136
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At the same time, climate emergency declarations tap into the energetic nature of emergency
powers. As noted above, most jurisdictions emphasize the urgency of action to reduce emissions
and many set out an expedited or accelerated schedule for specific actions. The Climate Change
Strategy for ACT illustrates the rapidity of anticipated reductions under its plan: its 2030 projection
for emissions reduction with additional measures is 8.5 times that of reductions for business as
usual. 137 After the First Minister’s climate emergency declaration, which stated ‘if we can go
further or faster, we will do so,’ Scotland did indeed update its proposed Climate Change Bill
amendments to a 2045 target, rather the original 2050 date.138
New instruments are also proposed or implemented through the emergency declaration. For
instance, Vancouver’s climate emergency declaration requires the development and
implementation of a carbon budget for the city, based on its proportion of emissions in a 1.5°C
warming scenario. London and Tāmaki Makaurau/Auckland have explicitly based their current
plans on detailed carbon budgets.139 One goal of the Tāmaki Makaurau/Auckland plan is to ensure
all decision-making does not exceed its carbon budget, an enduring commitment even through the
COVID-19 pandemic.140 A further example of creativity is Sydney’s call to create a federal Just
Transition Authority, an independent commission with a mandate to transition workers in the fossil
fuel industry into alternate, suitable employment. While the Australian government has not
responded, Scotland implemented a similar innovation. The Scottish Just Transition Commission,
an independent commission, issued wide-ranging recommendations to the government on how to
give effect to a just and fair transition.141 Some of these recommendations include new tools for
land-use planning and a reformed legal framework for land ownership.142
Related to this paradox is a second. Climate emergency declarations address the need for unilateral
action while also embracing society-wide mobilization and partnership. We have seen that
conventional emergencies evoke concerns about the concentration of power in the executive
branch because emergencies present an opportunity for a power grab with only weak mechanisms
for accountability. Indeed, it is this notion of the activated executive which appeals to climate
activists who draw on wartime analogies for framing the response to climate change.
Some of this activation and consolidation is evident in the declarations. In Aotearoa/New Zealand,
the urgency and priority of the climate emergency is signalled by leadership at the very top: a
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climate response ministerial group, chaired by the Prime Minister.143 Scotland’s Just Transition
Commission calls for the Deputy First Minister to be responsible for the just transition to zero
emissions.144 Similarly, the City of Toronto’s declaration is a long list of directives issued to city
staff. New cabinet committees and lists of new tasks and measures to be undertaken by a largely
out-of-sight bureaucracy raises common concerns about the use of emergency powers: that is, they
expand executive powers and undermine public participation and transparency through a rapid and
technical response.145 The centrality of emissions modeling and accounting in many of these plans
may raise similar concerns—that emergency response is moved into the realm of the technical
thereby limiting democratic engagement and political creativity.146 While perhaps an unintentional
mix-up, the exclusion of climate activists from the Senedd during the climate emergency
declaration debate is emblematic of wider concerns about emergency powers.147
However, this seems only part of the story. Implementation post-declaration has, in many
jurisdictions, emphasized society-wide mobilization and partnership. This is evident both in terms
of the measures identified in these plans and in the processes used to devise them. For instance, a
cornerstone of both the UK and Scottish governments’ implementation have been Citizens’
Assemblies, in which representative groups of roughly 100 citizens deliberated on how to address
the climate emergency.148 Citizens Assemblies provide a process through which to directly engage
citizens in policy development for responding to the declared climate emergency. The plan issued
by Tāmaki Makaurau/Auckland features partnership and cooperation as framing devices and
method. 149 The plan was developed with guidance from the Mana Whenua Kaitiaki Forum, a
governance body of Māori authorities; it was co-drafted with rangatahi (Māori youth); and it
specifically outlines which parts of implementation are the responsibility of Auckland Council,
central government, mana whenua, local boards, businesses, individuals and communities, young
people and rangatahi Māori, civil society, research institutions and academia, and C40 Cities.150
Beyond this broad engagement, some jurisdictions have designed institutions to make climate
emergency response accountable to those most vulnerable to climate change. For instance, Yukon
has constituted a Youth Panel, which advises the government on its 2030 Climate Plan. 151
Vancouver has a Climate and Equity Working Group, which reviews all actions on climate

143

New Zealand, Parliament, Cabinet Business Committee, Climate Change Emergency and whole-of-government
responses (2 December 2020), p. 5.
144
Just Transition Commission, n. 119 above, p. 72.
145
Hopkins n. 38 above; Grow Sun & McCormick, n. 40 above.
146
Hulme, n. 19 at 25.
147
Wales, n. 98 above, at 472.
148
Climate Assembly UK, n. 117 above, p. 4; Scotland’s Climate Assembly, Scotland’s Climate Assembly:
Recommendations for Actions (Scotland’s Climate Assembly, 2021).
149
Auckland Council, n. 89 above, pp. 6-7.
150
ibid, at p. 118. London too sets out partnership and roles for all governments and sectors of society: Greater
London Authority, n. 130 above, pp. 30-35
151
Yukon, n. 136 above, p. 64.

26

Forthcoming Transnational Environmental Law
emergency response and has had a notable impact on the policies announced thus far.152 In Tāmaki
Makaurau/Auckland, the Independent Māori Statutory Board and the Mana Whenua Kaitiaki
Forum are both involved in the implementation of the city’s climate plan.153 In addition, Yukon,
Vancouver Sydney, and Aotearoa/New Zealand all contemplate implementing climate actions in
partnership with Indigenous Peoples. Further institutional reform in the UK and Northern Ireland
contemplates new enforcement tools to ensure compliance with climate measures.154
What is clear is that, across these declarations, climate emergency response is unfolding through
complex, multi-level institutional dynamics. Multiple jurisdictions, government institutions and
communities are being engaged in the response. These intricate institutional relationships pose
questions about accountability and coordination, which are worthy of further analysis in light of
each jurisdiction’s legal culture and institutional norms. At a broad-level, however, it is worth
observing that climate emergency declarations are, in many instances, provoking institutional
innovation as a form of accountability.
This institutional creativity cuts against the assumption that an emergency activates a centralized,
unified executive. Climate emergency declarations reveal a suite of ‘jurisdictional problems,’155
through coordination challenges with other governments and calls to mobilize society broadly.
These jurisdictional problems are illustrated by Sydney’s climate emergency declaration, which
identifies climate impacts on the people of Sydney but then declares that climate change ‘should
be treated as a national emergency.’ 156 Similarly, the Scottish government declared a ‘global
climate emergency.’ 157 Australian municipal and territorial governments capture coordination
challenges when they place the blame squarely on the ‘shameful’ conduct and inaction of the
federal government.158 Sub-national governments in the UK, too, note the constraints they face
from an unresponsive central government.159
Cities have played a leading role with climate emergency declarations and responses, as local
governments continue to find new and innovative ways to advance climate action in the face of
limited resources and power.160 Municipal climate emergency responses feature specific measures
to engage higher levels of government. Developing ‘a lobbying strategy for a range of new and
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existing asks from central government’ is identified as a key priority under London’s climate
emergency declaration. 161 Vancouver also notes a pandemic-induced shift from investment to
regulation and advocacy.162 Partnership and coordination with other cities is a theme across these
declarations, and one that echoes both the necessity and challenge of multi-level governance in
emergency response.
Climate emergency declarations illustrate the challenge of needing to act unilaterally in response
to threats to life, livelihood and property, while also facing jurisdictional and coordination
complexity. Indeed, much of the most tangible climate emergency response action is taking place
at the scale of the local. What makes the unilateral action remarkable is that most of these
jurisdictions are municipalities—the relative contribution of each to global GHG emissions is
tiny—yet they forge ahead with some of the most specific and ambitious climate emergency
actions. Like other systemic, social issues, ‘[a]lthough federal and provincial governments have
helped to create this … crisis, it is largely the cities that are left to solve the problem.’ 163
Vancouver, London, Sydney and Tāmaki Makaurau/Auckland all seek greater support from central
governments, but they do not wait on this.164 Rather, their declarations all express the hope that
they will be in a stronger position to make these requests of other jurisdictions—and indeed
broader society—if local governments themselves show leadership.
The need for rapid, exceptional and coordinated action animates these climate emergency
declarations and thus engages similar questions of authority and accountability that occupy public
law scholars. Climate emergency declarations and their implementation thus far reveal mostly
familiar, routine governance practices as well as some institutional invigoration though actual and
proposed novel measures (carbon budgets) and executive bodies (Cabinet committee, Just
Transition Commission). While these new features raise familiar concerns about undermining
democratic norms and consolidating power, much of ongoing implementation has featured
partnership and society-wide mobilization. Climate emergency declarations contain a rich dialogue
about the regulation of emergencies as exception and, in fact, highlight the varied modes of
governance that are being brought to bear on the climate challenge.
Conclusion
Climate emergency declarations spotlight ongoing public law debates over how emergencies are
governed by law. The legally-ambiguous nature of these declarations concentrate disparate and
contested assumptions about emergencies. Through an analysis of a subset of climate emergency
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declarations, it has argued that these declarations engage the perennial worries of public law
scholars about emergencies: the difficulty of definition, the necessary but shifting role of time, and
the issues of authority and accountability that flow from resort to emergency powers. It has shown
that, along each of these dimensions, climate emergency declarations are filled with paradoxes.
The climate emergency is at once known and unknown, acute and systemic, immediate and
expansive, temporary and transformative, routine and exceptional, centralizing and decentralizing.
These paradoxes have legal significance because they are rooted in ongoing debates over the
governance of emergencies in law. The proliferation of climate emergency declarations around the
world has shifted climate discourse to emphasize the need for wide-scale, coordinated action to
protect communities from worst-case scenarios. But, as we have seen, the emergency frame does
not circumvent difficult legal and policy dilemmas. Instead, climate emergency declarations shift
the terrain to new debates over how to govern through crisis. Emergencies are always complex
political, legal and regulatory phenomena, characterized by multiple paradigms. Climate
emergency declarations provide a snapshot of these debates; they condense and crystallize the
many paradoxes of emergencies in public law; they allow us to see the dialogic nature of ‘the
emergency’ as it plays out on this new terrain of climate disruption.
Public law scholars have described climate change as a ‘legally disruptive phenomenon’ because,
climate change forces legal concepts, doctrines, and assumptions to evolve beyond incremental
application. 165 Perhaps climate emergency declarations are one site of legal disruption.
Emergencies always contain the possibility for disruption. They are unstable moments in which a
fixed image of the future is not a given.166 Climate emergency declarations reflect back to us this
instability in the form of public law paradoxes. They stress that, in a climate disrupted world, the
future is very much up for debate.
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